COLLOQUIUM
             Computer Science Department, Boston University
                                    and
          Reliable Information Systems and Cyber Security Center
                              Boston University

Speaker: Silvio Micali
         MIT

Date:  Wednesday, November 9
Time:  3:10 PM
Place: Room CAS 313, 685 Commonwealth Avenue
Coffee: 2:55 PM in 313 CAS

Title: RATIONAL SECURE COMPUTATION and IDEAL MECHANISM DESIGN

Abstract:

We put forward and implement Rational Secure Computation, a stronger
notion of secure computation that does not depend on players' honesty, but
solely on their rationality.
                                                                                                       
The key to our result is showing that the ballot box---the venerable
device used throughout the world to privately and correctly compute the
tally of secret votes---can actually be used to securely compute ANY
function of secret inputs.
                                                                                                       
Our work bridges the fields of Game Theory and Cryptography, and has broad
implications for Mechanism Design. In particular, we show how to construct
mechanisms that guarantee the maximum privacy about the players' types
(while leaving all incentives intact), and how to achieve Modular
Mechanism Design.
                                                                                                       
Joint work with Sergei Izmalkov and Matt Lepinski

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This is the first colloquium of Boston University's Reliable Information
Systems and Cyber Security (RISCS) Center.  To receive
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Host: Leonid Levin and Leonid Reyzin